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Abstract
We document that the net factor income smoothing channel in OECD countries is pri-
marily driven by net financial asset income, while the other two sub-components (net com-
pensation of employees, net taxes on imports) turn out to be ineffective. Once factor income
inflows are distinguished from outflows, empirical evidence suggests a non-significant effect
of inflows in terms of income smoothing as opposed to a positive and significant role of
factor income outflows (18 percent for the EMU and 16 percent for the EU). Factor income
outflows also appear robust with respect to positive output shocks, while neither factor in-
come inflows nor factor income outflows provide insurance against negative output shocks.
In terms of the determinants of income smoothing, results indicate that an increase in for-
eign equity and debt liabilities positively affect the extent of smoothing via factor income
outflows. Whereas, contrary to the current literature, an increase in foreign assets holding
does not have a positive impact on smoothing via factor income inflows. The tendency of
European investors’ in allocating a sizeable portion of their assets within the Euro zone is
shown to undermine income smoothing.
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1 Introduction
In today’s globalized world, in addition to the amount of risk sharing taking place via domes-
tic channels,1 households could also minimize their income/consumption risk by investing in
foreign assets. By investing in foreign assets, that do not necessarily yield identical timing
of returns, domestic investors can reduce the overall variance (a common metric of measuring
risk) of their financial portfolios. Grubel (1968) pointed out that international diversification
can improve mean-variance trade-off compared to holding a purely domestic portfolio. In spite
of the supposed benefits from international diversification, investors during 1990s showed very
little inclination towards holding foreign assets. Analyzing cross-border equity holdings, French
and Poterba (1991) observe very high domestic ownership of shares in world’s five largest stock
markets: United State (92.2%), Japan (95.7%), United Kingdom (92%), Germany (79%), and
France (89.4%). The observation that investors hold too little of their wealth in foreign assets
has been dubbed as (equity) “home bias” in the literature.2
In recent years, however, portfolio home bias has declined (rather disproportionately). Table
1, adopted from Kang and Melas (2010), reports the extent of home bias reduction in selected
OECD markets over the 1997-2007 period. The figures reveal significant reduction in home
bias in several European markets (notably in the Netherlands), while Japan remains the most
home-biased (83.7%), and the US and UK both exhibiting a level of home bias around 52% in
2007. “Such high levels of home bias represent a significant diversion from a market-cap-based
global equity portfolio” (Kang and Melas, 2010, p. 3). Although European markets show a
decline in home bias over the last decade, a closer look at the equity allocation patterns reveal
that European asset owners have adopted a regional approach to equity allocation. That is,
over the years, EU investors’ holdings of EU-originated assets (than other destinations) has
tremendously increased. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2008) (hereafter DOS) noticed
that about 60 percent of total EU equity investments were invested within the EU. A similar
pattern was observed in investments in debt securities. This recent phenomenon has been
dubbed as (portfolio) “Euro bias” in the literature – see Balli et al. (2010) and the references
1Within a country risk sharing can be achieved in at least three ways: (i) by cross-ownership of productive
assets facilitated by a developed capital market, (ii) through the tax-transfer system of the federal (central)
government, and (iii) through lending and borrowing on national credit markets. For empirical applications of
channels of risk sharing see, among others, Asdrubali et al. (1996) for U.S. states; Balli et al. (2009) for Canadian
provinces; and Balli and Sørensen (2007) for OECD nations.
2See Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for excellent surveys of the home bias literature. Foad (2008)
offers various explanations to the home bias puzzle.
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therein for related discussion.
As higher international diversification (or lower home bias) is presumed to generate higher
income risk sharing, a large home bias likewise is associated with low risk sharing. Hence,
home bias and risk sharing can be viewed as manifestations of the same underlying behavior.
Sørensen, Wu, Yosha, and Zhu (2007) (hereafter SWYZ) empirically analyze this hypothesis
for 24 OECD countries over the 1993-2003 period. To quantify income smoothing as a measure
of risk sharing, SWYZ use the net factor income channel which is the difference between gross
domestic product (GDP) and gross national income (GNI).3 Income smoothing via the net factor
income flows primarily takes place through two ways. One way is from the proceeds on factor
income flows via the asset side so that when receipts from foreign assets strongly counter-move
with aggregate (or group) output growth, high income smoothing occurs. However, income dis-
smoothing can be witnessed if foreign asset returns co-move one-to-one (or react more strongly
to the changes in domestic output) with domestic output. The other way is through payments
on foreign owned domestic assets via the liabilities side. A higher amount of income smoothing
results when the payments on foreign liabilities are closely connected to domestic output growth.
Taking this approach, the amount of income smoothing depends on the degree of co-movement
between foreign payments and domestic output growth. SWYZ find that a high level of foreign
portfolio assets is positively and robustly related to income risk sharing. For consumption
risk sharing, SWYZ find that the equity and foreign direct investment (FDI) components of
international assets holdings are more relevant than debt holding. SWYZ find no significant
role for liabilities in income risk sharing, save for some evidence of consumption risk sharing
through FDI liabilities. SWYZ, however, did not give much emphasis on the importance of
financial liability payments on income smoothing. Interestingly, for the EU region, even though
income smoothing via net factor income has recently increased (Balli and Sørensen, 2007), the
connection between the level of financial asset holdings and smoothing via factor income flows is
not strong enough, according to DOS. Both these statements suggest that the relation between
the amount of foreign asset holdings and income smoothing via foreign asset revenues should
be revisited again.
Taking SWYZ as our benchmark study, this paper makes two contributions to the literature.
First, extending the GDP variance decomposition due to Asdrubali et al. (1996), we decompose
the net factor income channel into factor income inflows and factor income outflows in order to
3GNI was previously known as gross national product (GNP).
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examine the sole effect of revenues from foreign asset holdings on income smoothing.4 Prelimi-
nary results indicate that the net factor income channel in the OECD countries during 1999-2007
period is mainly driven by net financial asset income, while the other two sub-components (net
compensation of employees, net taxes on imports) turn out to be ineffective. Once factor income
inflows are distinguished from outflows, empirical evidence suggests a non-significant effect of
inflows in terms of income smoothing as opposed to a positive and significant role of factor in-
come outflows (18 percent for the EMU and 16 percent for the EU). When shocks to income are
decomposed into positive and negative realizations, results indicate that factor income outflows
are statistically significant only to smooth the positive shocks to GDP, while neither inflows or
outflows channels are significant enough in attenuating negative output shocks. Furthermore,
the factor income outflow channel appears robust to longer lasting shocks than factor income
inflows, whereas the latter is shown to play important role in consumption smoothing. Second,
we present an analysis of the determinants of income smoothing in accordance with the empir-
ical strategy first introduced by Me`litz and Zumer (1999) and subsequently developed by other
contributors (among others, SWYZ). Our findings can be summarized as follows: an increase
in foreign equity and debt liabilities positively affects the extent of smoothing via factor income
outflows. Whereas, contrary to the current literature, an increase in foreign assets holding does
not have a positive impact on smoothing via factor income inflows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the theory under-
pinning risk sharing. Section 3 describes the specification of models employed throughout the
paper. It also includes a short discussion on the construction of an index of diversification for
foreign asset holdings, which we used as a potential determinant of income smoothing. Section 4
presents data and empirical results. Section 5 discusses empirical evidence on the determinants
of income smoothing. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical framework
Risk sharing indicates that economic agents or countries can share risk with each other. In
this section we briefly outline the basic ideas for endowment economies with one homogeneous
tradable good. For a fuller discussion interested readers are referred to Obstfeld and Rogoff
4According to the IMF’s fifth edition of its Balance of Payments Manual (BOPM5), net factor income flows
are decomposed into the net income flows from non-immigrants living abroad (the net compensation of employees
from rest of the world), net tax (subsidy) on imports and net income from foreign assets (net interest receivables
and net dividend receipts and net retained earnings).
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(1996).
Let us consider period t per capita output of country i is an exogenous random variable
with a commonly known probability distribution. Each country’s representative consumer is
a risk averse expected utility maximizer. Consumers within each country are identical with
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions, and we also assume that perfect
Arrow-Debreu markets for contingent claims exist. When risk is fully shared among countries,
the consumption of a country co-moves with world consumption but not with country-specific
shocks.
A testable implication of perfect risk sharing is that consumption growth rates are identical
for all countries, i.e., ∆ log cit = c + βt∆ log C
W
t + it, where c is a constant, c
i
t is country i’s
per capita consumption, CWt is world per capita consumption in period t, and it are error
terms (due to either taste shocks or noise). The general intuition is that after controlling for
aggregate consumption growth, the consumption growth rate of a country should not be a
function of output growth of that country. Regression based tests for full risk sharing at the
country level were studied by Obstfeld (1994), Canova and Ravn (1996), and Lewis (1996) –
see Lewis (1995) for a comprehensive survey.5
It is of practical interest to quantify the extent of risk sharing between countries rather than
testing the abstract notion of perfect risk sharing. It is also useful to identify the channels
through which risk is shared and to quantify the amount of risk sharing obtained via each
channel. There are several mechanisms for sharing output risk. The most straightforward way
of sharing risk internationally is through international income diversification, i.e., through cross-
border ownership of financial assets. Net income from foreign assets is reflected in the national
accounts data as the difference between GDP and GNI. Specifically, net factor income flows
from abroad explain the difference between income earned by residents in foreign countries less
the income earned by non-residents in the domestic economy. This type of risk sharing is termed
income smoothing that is mainly an outcome of countries owning assets in other countries. The
main idea behind income smoothing via net factor income is that if domestic economic agents
have diversified their investments abroad, then foreign asset income will be facilitated in terms
of smoothing income by partially detaching it from domestic output shocks.
5The first tests for full risk sharing, using individual-level data, were performed by Cochrane (1991), Mace
(1991), and Townsend (1994). The International Real Business Cycle literature, most notably Backus et al.
(1992), Baxter and Crucini (1995), and Stockman and Tesar (1995), examined the prediction that the correlation
of consumption across countries should be equal to unity. The data, however, are far from confirming that
prediction.
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3 Model specifications
The literature on income smoothing has shown that agents can insure their income against
country-specific output risks by holding an internationally diversified portfolio. Holding of
foreign financial assets may generate net factor income flows that might partially insulate against
the idiosyncratic fluctuations in GDP. SWYZ apply the following regression to measure the level
of factor income smoothing:
∆ log G˜NI
i
t = vi,t + βf∆ log G˜DP
i
t + i,t, (1)
where ∆˜logGDPit is the annual change in GDP per capita in constant prices minus the union-wide
counterpart (∆logGDPt), ∆ log G˜NIit is the annual change in GNI per capita in constant prices
minus the union-wide counterpart(∆logGNIt), and νi,t and i,t are constant and error terms,
respectively.6 βf measures the co-movement of a country’s GNI growth rate with GDP growth
rate. The remaining amount, 1-βf , measures the amount of income smoothing via net factor
inflows.7 As βf approaches to zero, GNI and GDP per capita growth rates will be less correlated,
thereby resulting in higher income smoothing via net factor income channel. As value of βf
approaching to 1 implies that GNI and GDP per capita growth rates are perfectly correlated,
so that net factor income flow channel does not yield any meaningful income smoothing.
3.1 Decomposition of income smoothing via the net factor income
We decompose income smoothing via the net factor income channel into factor income inflows
and factor income outflows. Dividing the differences between GDP and GNI into two parts–
adding in the income inflow and then deducting the income outflow–leads to the following
relationships:
∆ log G˜DPINit = ν
+
f,t + β
+
f ∆ log G˜DP
i
t + 
+
i,t, (2)
∆ log ˜GDPOUTit = ν
−
f,t + β
−
f ∆ log G˜DP
i
t + 
−
i,t, (3)
6“Union-wide” in this paper specifically corresponds either to EU-14 or to high income OECD members. For
instance, in the case of EU-14, ∆ ˜logGDPi is equal to the real GDP per capita growth rate of country i minus the
aggregate real GDP per capita growth rate of EU-14.
7The derivation of equation (1) is explained in details in the Appendix.
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where GDPIN = GDP + FACTOR INCOME INFLOW; GDPOUT = GDP − FACTOR INCOME OUTFLOW.
Adding these two equations together yields the following equation:
βf ≈ β+f + β−f , (4)
where β+f (β
−
f ) is the coefficient of income smoothing via the factor income inflows (outflows)
channel.
3.2 Determinants of smoothing via factor income inflows and outflows
In order to gauge the determinants of income smoothing via the factor income channels, we
follow Me`litz and Zumer (1999) in modeling income smoothing as a time-varying process and
impose the following structure on the coefficient estimates of smoothing from factor income
flows. Equations (2) and (3), by allowing the income smoothing channels to change over time,
are to be explained by other factors:
∆ log G˜DPINit = γ
+
t ∆ log G˜DP
i
t + 
+
i,t, (5)
∆ log ˜GDPOUTit = γ
−
t ∆ log G˜DP
i
t + 
−
i,t, (6)
where γ+ (γ−) measures the co-movement of a country’s idiosyncratic GDPIN (GDPOUT) growth
and GDP per capita growth, and 1-γ+ (1-γ−) measures income smoothing via the factor income
inflows (outflows) channel.
We assume that both channels are explained by some factors:
γ+ = γ+0 + γ
+
1 δi, (7)
γ− = γ−0 + γ
−
1 δi, (8)
where δi is an interaction variable that is assumed to explain the corresponding sub-channels.
Following Me`litz and Zumer (1999) and SWYZ, we extend the existing methodology as:
γ+ = γ+0 + γ
+
1 (TREND − TRENDt) + γ+2 (Xit − Xt), (9)
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and
γ− = γ−0 + γ
−
1 (TREND − TRENDt) + γ−2 (Xit − Xt), (10)
where X is a set of interaction variables that are considered to explain the income smoothing
via factor income inflow and outflow channels. TREND denotes the linear time trend. In the first
model, 1−γ+0 −γ+1 (TREND−TRENDt)−γ+2 (Xit−Xt) measures the extent of smoothing via factor
income inflows achieved by country i for period t. Specifically, the parameter γ+0 measures
the unweighted pooled average income smoothing via the factor income inflow channel; γ+1
measures the average year-by-year increase in income smoothing; and γ+2 measures the extent
of linkage between interaction variables and income smoothing. Likewise, in the second model,
1 − γ−0 − γ−1 (TREND − TRENDt) − γ−2 (Xit − Xt) measures the extent of smoothing via factor
income outflows obtained by country i for period t. The parameters γ−0 , γ
−
1 , and γ
−
2 have
similar interpretation but from the perspective of factor income outflows.
3.2.1 Index of diversification for foreign asset holdings
As a possible determinant of income smoothing, we propose an index of diversification for foreign
equity and bond holdings across different countries as follows:
DIVi,t =
FMCi,t∑N
j=1 |(θji,t − θmaxi,t )|
, (11)
where θji is the ratio of equity (bond) holdings of OECD member i from country j over total
foreign equity holdings of country i. θmaxi is the maximum ratio of foreign equity holdings
of country i from country j. N is the number of the countries that country i diversifies its
foreign portfolio with, which is set equal to 30.8 FMC stands for ratio of the market (bond
and equity) capitalization of country i to world market capitalization. The index gives larger
weight to countries with highly diversified foreign equity (bond) portfolios with higher rate of
stock market capitalization, and smaller weight to those that hold equity (bond) from a limited
number of foreign markets with lower rate of stock market capitalization.
We end the discussion of this section by briefly outlining the econometric methodology em-
ployed throughout the paper. To account for autocorrelation in the residuals we assume that the
error terms in each equation/country follow an AR(1) process. Due to short sample we restrict
the autocorrelation parameter to be identical across countries/equations. We allow for country
8We used different values of N ranging from 20 to 35, the results did not change substantially.
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specific variances of the error terms. Following Sørensen and Yosha (1998), the estimation is
carried out using a two-step Generalized Least Squares (GLS) procedure: (i) the entire panel is
estimated using ordinary least squares (which is equivalent to a seemingly unrelated regressions
type estimation since the model contains identical regressors), and (ii) residuals from first step
is used to estimate variance for each country and corrected for heteroscedasticity. Unless stated
otherwise, we use differenced data at the yearly frequency.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Data
We use a broad sample of high-income OECD countries to investigate the relationship between
international portfolio allocation and income smoothing.9 We obtain pair-wise volume of cross
border-equity holdings in US dollars from the International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated Port-
folio Investment Surveys (CPIS) for the period 2001–2007. This survey data-set is known to
be reliable, since the surveys were conducted using guidelines that are consistent in measuring
bonds and equity holdings across countries. The financial assets and liabilities of each country
were taken from IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. National accounts
data were taken from OECD’s National Accounts, Main Aggregates (Volume I) and the de-
tailed tables (Volume II) that cover the period 1970–2007. Further details are provided in the
Appendix.
4.2 Income smoothing via factor income inflows and outflows
As a first step, we decompose the net factor income flows into three sub-channels, namely, net
compensation of employees (short-term labor income), net taxes on imports (indirect business
tax), and net financial asset income. The empirical model concerning income smoothing for the
three sub-channels are specified as follows:
(∆ log ˜GDP + NET COMP. OF EMPLOYEE)it = νcp,t + βcp∆ log G˜DP
i
t + i,t, (12)
9The dataset include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK,
and the US. We consider three sub-groups: EMU (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain); EU-14: (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.) Non-EU OECD: (Australia, Canada,
Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the US.)
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(∆ log ˜GDP + NET TAX ON IMPORT)it = νtp,t + βtp∆ log G˜DP
i
t + i,t, (13)
(∆ log ˜GDP + NET FIN. ASSET INCOME)it = νfa,t + βfa∆ log G˜DP
i
t + i,t, (14)
The estimated coefficients of the above three equations are presented in Table 2. Results indicate
that neither net compensation of employees nor net taxes on imports appear as a significant
source of net factor income smoothing. The estimated coefficients are small in magnitude and
in some cases they indicate dis-smoothing, but these effects are not statistically significant.
By contrast, the estimated coefficients of net financial asset revenues is positive and strongly
significant, particularly for the EMU and EU samples, suggesting that factor income smoothing
in the OECD countries during 1999-2007 was primarily driven by income flows from net foreign
asset holdings.10
Next, Table 3 presents estimation results for income smoothing via aggregate factor income
flows, factor income inflows, and factor income outflows. Results are presented over four sub-
periods for EMU, EU, and non-EU OECD countries. The topmost row in each panel in Table 3
presents overall income smoothing via net factor income, indicated by (1 − βf ). Results show
that income smoothing via net factor income (1−βf ) has begun only in the most recent decade11,
as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient. The effect is unambiguously
stronger for EMU countries compared to the EU and non-EU OECD countries. This is to be
expected, as EMU countries enjoyed the benefit(s) of monetary union in terms of increased
cross-border portfolio holdings and lowered trading costs. For both the EU and non-EU OECD
countries, it has a similar positive effect, with borderline significance (p-value around 0.10),
which may be considered significant in view of the rather small sample size (7 years). Both
SWYZ and DOS obtain similar results documenting net factor income as a significant channel
of income smoothing for OECD countries. These findings are fully consistent with the recent
decline in ‘home bias’ puzzle mentioned in the Introduction.
We are also able to identify whether income smoothing occurred as a result of factor income
inflows or factor income outflows, or both. The second row in each panel in Table 3 presents the
estimated coefficients of income smoothing via factor income inflows (1 − β+f ). An interesting
10Nonetheless, compensation of employees contributed to consumption smoothing for the EU15 countries over
the 1980-2005 period, while indirect taxes generated consumption dis-smoothing. Further discussion is available
in Afonso and Furceri (2007).
11Over the 1966-1990 period, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) did not find any significant evidence of cross-country
factor income flows to cross-country risk sharing. This was likely due to the small difference between GDP
and GNI (as a ratio of GDP) in most industrial countries, as noticed by Atkeson and Bayoumi (1993) over the
1963-1986 period.
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result emerges. Factor income inflows caused income dis-smoothing in EU and EMU countries
in the past two decades. Particularly, during the 1991-2000 period the extent of income dis-
smoothing was relatively higher and strongly significant. Post-Euro, the effect declined in
magnitude by 50% for the EU countries, although the impact is not statistically significant. By
comparison, the non-EU OECD countries experienced a lesser extent of dis-smoothing during
1991-2000, and some indication of positive income smoothing during 2001-2007 period (though it
is not statistically significant). One possible explanation for this surprising result is the increased
business cycle synchronization across EU economies, which resulted in a higher exposure to
mainly symmetric shocks by member countries. Thus, while higher correlation of business cycle
was pursued in order to minimize the stabilization cost of giving up an independent monetary
policy, the adoption of the Euro has however prevented monetary policy from adjusting to
shocks and has led to economic dislocation in some of its members (as became clear during
the recent economic and financial crises).12 This result encompasses the finding by Afonso
and Furceri (2007), where a staggering 63% of shock to GDP among the 15 EMU countries
remained unsmoothed.13 Furthermore, we suspect that the tendency of European assets owners
in the post-Euro era to hold more intra-Euro portfolios than international portfolios worked
unfavorably in achieving cross-country risk sharing from cross-country factor income (in)flows.14
The last row in each panel of Table 3 reports estimated coefficients of the extent of income
smoothing via factor income outflows, (1− β−f ). Income smoothing is unambiguously negative
in 1970s and 1980s, thereafter it is positive with a strong and significant impact particularly
for the EMU and EU countries. Why income smoothing is positively related with factor in-
come outflows? Intuitively, the pro-cyclicality between higher outflows from home country and
higher output growth in the host country drives this result. As an example, consider France
sending outflows to Germany. A positive and strong output growth in Germany will result in
higher dividend payments by German companies to French investors, causing positive income
smoothing in France. However, due to increased output correlation among EU countries (see,
de Haan et al., 2008), German investors investing in France will also benefit from portfolio out-
flows. Nevertheless, not all countries may simultaneously benefit from portfolio outflows, since
much depend on host country’s ability to channel capital inflows into productive investments.
12See de Haan et al. (2008) for surveys of empirical research dealing with business cycle synchronization among
the current members of the monetary union in Europe.
13Not surprisingly, for an enlarged EMU with 25 members, the unsmoothed component rises to 69%.
14A recent study by Balli et al. (2010) has demonstrated the rising trends in intra-Euro debt and equity
holdings, they however did not relate their results to income smoothing.
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Whilst our panel estimates show evidence of positive and significant income smoothing from
factor income outflows, we cannot rule out the possibility of subdued effect on income smooth-
ing at the individual country level due to differences in country size, labor market condition,
and government policies. We hope to explore this issue in a future research.
It is worth stating that if the size of overall asset portfolios are small relative to GDP, home
bias may be of little importance for risk sharing. One could thus claim that the lack of risk
sharing from factor income flows documented in this paper could be due to the smaller overall
size of inflows than outflows relative to GDP. To appreciate this point, in Figure 1 we display
the share of foreign asset receipt and foreign liability payments relative to GDP. As can be seen,
save for Ireland and Korea, the two ratios track each other closely, implying that our results are
not driven by lower asset portfolio to GDP ratio. Finally, Figures 2a,b graphically illustrate the
results presented above. The year-by-year coefficients are obtained after smoothing the time-
variation using a Normal kernel with bandwidth (standard deviation) 2. The Figures speak for
themselves and are consistent with the results presented above.
4.3 Income smoothing via asymmetric output shocks and their persistence
The preceding discussion made no allowance for the distinction between positive and negative
output shocks, an omission that could bias the coefficients attached to output, thereby leading
to a misinterpretation of the results. For example, when a country is on a positive growth path,
it likely to face more permanent positive shocks over negative ones, causing the absolute value
of the coefficient attached to positive shocks to inflate. If the economy is fairly well insured
against negative shocks, not distinguishing positive shocks from negative shocks might result in
lack of recognition of these insurance capabilities (Pierucci and Ventura, 2010, p. 711).15 To
guard against this possibility, following Pierucci and Ventura (2010), we augment our income
insurance regression by explicitly distinguishing between “positive” and “negative” realizations
of the GDP shock variable:
∆ log G˜DPINit = ν
+
f,t + β
+
f1∆ log G˜DP
+
it + β
+
f2∆ log G˜DP
−
it + 
+
i,t, (15)
∆ log ˜GDPOUTit = ν
−
f,t + β
−
f1∆ log G˜DP
+
it + β
−
f2∆ log G˜DP
−
it + 
−
i,t, (16)
15We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention.
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where GDP+it and GDP
−
it are the positive and negative output shocks respectively. Following
Pierucci and Ventura (2010), we use an output gap process to distinguish between positive and
negative realizations of the GDP. Assuming that trend output16 is the level of output that a
country wishes to secure, negative GDP component is defined as those corresponding to periods
of negative output gap (actual GDP minus trend GDP), and positive GDP components to those
corresponding to periods of positive output gap.
The results are reported in Table 4. Consistent with the results shown in Table 3, the esti-
mated coefficients of positive domestic output shocks (∆ log G˜DP+it) are positive and statistically
significant for factor income outflow and net factor income flow channels during the 2001-2007
period for all three groups of countries. Moreover, the extent of income smoothing over the
1991-2007 period from outflow and net factor income channels are clearly higher for EMU
and EU countries reflecting the increase in output growth correlations across these economies.
Whereas over the same time period, although negative output shocks (∆ log G˜DP−it) have not
been significantly smoothed by these two channels (excluding the factor income outflow channel
for non-EU OECD countries), overall the estimated coefficients are positive indicating an im-
provement in risk-sharing mechanism to deal with negative idiosyncratic shocks when compared
with previous decades. Noticeably, factor income outflow channel has contributed to a persis-
tent smoothing of negative output shocks for non-EU OECD countries over the entire sample
period. This underscores the insurance capabilities of the non-EU OECD economies in dealing
with negative idiosyncratic shocks to output.
A closer look at the coefficients of factor income inflows reveals the relevance of splitting the
idiosyncratic shocks into positive and negative components. Quite surprisingly, factor income
inflows have resulted in dis-smoothing with respect to both positive and negative output shocks
over the 1991-2007 period, but these effects are statistically insignificant for the negative real-
ization of idiosyncratic risk. Ironically, both EMU and EU countries appear to be benefitted
from factor income inflows during the pre-1990 period than the post-1990 period. This is clearly
seen from the positive and significant coefficients of (1 − β+f ) attached to negative shocks and
in two incidents with respect to positive shocks. This finding appears to contradict with the
objectives of the European monetary union where member nations are expected to benefit from
increased financial integration with each other, in which factor income inflow is one of the means
of insuring against idiosyncratic risk. In retrospect, it is easy to see why the financial crisis of
16We use the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter to extract the time- varying trend from the original data.
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2007-2008 has taken a heavy toll on European economies (particularly the PIIGS17 countries).
As evident from our results, post-Euro factor income inflows didn’t contribute to risk sharing at
all in EMU/EU countries. All in all, our findings suggest that income smoothing via net factor
income flows or factor income outflows are significant only to smooth positive output shocks,
these channels are not significant enough in attenuating negative output shocks.
We now examine in what way the channels of income smoothing are affected by the per-
sistence of idiosyncratic shocks. As pointed our by Asdrubali et al. (1996, p. 1098): “highly
persistence shocks can be insured through advance purchase of securities on capital markets
but are difficult to smooth ex post on credit markets since those who wish to borrow are un-
able to repay.” That’s exactly what some PIIGS countries have faced in recent years when
borrowing became much harder once the financial crisis intensified after the failure of Lehman
Brothers in mid-September 2008. We have followed Asdrubali et al. (1996) and re-estimated
equations (12)-(14) with a three-year difference interval in order to capture the response of
changes in income/consumption to longer lasting shocks to GDP. Shorter term fluctuations in
income/consumption have small welfare implications compared to longer lasting fluctuations
and hedging against longer-term fluctuation are therefore important. Results are displayed in
Table 5. The amount of income smoothing via factor income outflow and net factor income
channels over the 1990-2007 period are slightly higher with the differing frequency18, compared
to those presented in Table 3. This finding is in line with Sørensen and Yosha (1998), who
found that smoothing from cross-ownership of assets is much more “permanent.” Echoing ear-
lier results, factor income inflows generated significant income dis-smoothing with longer lasting
shocks.19
4.4 Consumption smoothing via factor income inflows and outflows
The discussion so far has ignored consumption smoothing. Following DOS, consumption smooth-
ing here captures risk sharing from all sources including income smoothing.20 The basic regres-
sion specification that is used to quantify the amount of consumption smoothing via factor
17PIIGS: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain.
18Although results are less encouraging for the non-EU OECD economies, particularly with respect to the net
factor income channel.
19We have also considered a longer differencing period, however, the results remain unaffected, and therefore
not presented here to conserve space. These unreported results are available on request.
20Generally, consumption smoothing is defined to reflect whether consumption is smoother than disposable
income. Our choice of alternative definition is mainly for expository purposes.
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income flows is given by:
∆ log (˜C)it = υc + βc log G˜DP
i
t + 
+
i,t, (17)
where ∆ log (˜C)it is the difference between country i’s per capita final consumption and aggregate
per capita final consumption for the group at time t, υ and +i,t are the constant and error terms,
respectively. The coefficient βc measures the average co-movement of a country’s idiosyncratic
consumption growth with respect to its idiosyncratic GDP growth in year t. The lower the co-
movement, the higher amount of consumption is buffered against GDP fluctuations, therefore a
lower βc is expected; 1− βc, measures the total consumption smoothing. To quantify the effect
of the factor income inflows and outflows on consumption smoothing, we estimate the following
regressions:
∆ log ˜(C− FACTOR INCOME INFLOW)it = υ+c + β+c log G˜DPit + +i,t, (18)
and
∆ log ˜(C− FACTOR INCOME OUTFLOW)it = υ−c + β−c log G˜DPit + −i,t, (19)
where coefficients β+c (β
−
c ) measure the average co-movement of a country’s idiosyncratic con-
sumption with factor income inflow (outflow) growth with respect to its idiosyncratic GDP
growth in period t, and 1 − β+c (1-β−c ) measures the amount of consumption smoothing via
factor income inflows (outflows).
Results are presented in Table 6. It is clear that from 1971 to 1990 factor income inflows or
outflows did not positively affect consumption smoothing in any of the three country groups.
Since 1990s, however, factor income inflows contributed considerably to consumption smooth-
ing. Between 1991 and 2000, consumption smoothing, on the back of capital income inflows,
increased by 21%, 20%, and 14% respectively in EMU, EU, and non-EU OECD countries. Al-
though in the recent decade the extent of smoothing has significantly declined, one can still
observe positive amount of consumption smoothing via factor income inflows during 2001-2007.
By comparison, factor income outflows caused positive consumption smoothing only for the
EMU nations.
5 Determinants of income smoothing
To shed light on the underlying factors behind income smoothing via factor inflows and outflows,
we estimate equations (5) and (6), which incorporate the amount of foreign assets and liabilities,
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and an index of diversification of foreign assets constructed earlier. The estimation results are
presented in Table 7, which includes the impact of the stocks of foreign assets (debt, equity, and
FDI) on income smoothing via factor income inflows for the EU and non-EU OECD samples.
It is immediately clear that, and contrary to SWYZ, the amount of foreign assets via factor
income inflows cause income dis-smoothing across EU and non-EU OECD countries. While
most of the effects are statistically insignificant, particularly for the EU members an increase in
foreign asset holdings (i.e., equity inflows) is shown to generate significant income dis-smoothing.
Comparable results for factor income outflows are reported in Table 8. Both equity and debt
liabilities generate significant amount of income smoothing for the EU countries, whereas the
effect of FDI liabilities on income smoothing is although positive but statistically insignificant.
Surprisingly, the impact of equity, debt, and FDI liabilities on income smoothing is negative in
non-EU OECD countries.
Next, we examine to what extent allocation patterns of cross-border investment affect income
smoothing via factor income inflows. The results are reported in Tables 9 and 10 respectively for
EU and non-EU OECD countries. The third and fourth rows in Table 9 indicate to what extent
risk sharing is correlated with the amount of assets invested in EMU countries (where returns
are likely to be more synchronized). The third row reports the estimated coefficient of Euro
countries’ share of foreign debt holdings, which is negative with respect to income smoothing.
This is not surprising given the remarkable degree of convergence achieved among government
bond yields as well as corporate bond returns across Euro markets.21 The observed high extent
of convergence has in turn diminished the scope of risk sharing from debt instruments. On
the contrary, cross-border equity investment provided positive (but statistically insignificant)
income smoothing. The last two rows report the estimated coefficients of the diversification
index created for foreign debt and equity portfolios respectively. As can be seen, both debt and
equity provided significant positive smoothing, indicating that when countries diversify their
portfolios equally across different markets, risk sharing improves. Turning to non-EU OECD
countries, we observe that holding debt and equity assets from Euro region caused income
dis-smoothing (see Table 10). By comparison, both diversification indices for equity and bond
assets have cased positive and significant coefficients. Similar to the results in Table 9, countries
with a greater diversified foreign portfolios experienced higher risk sharing.22
21See, e.g., Baele et al. (2004), Pagano (2004), Balli (2009), Balli et al. (2010), and Fuss et al. (2010).
22As a check of robustness, we have also employed the alternative measures of diversification proposed by
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Our proposed measure of diversification shows a strong positive correlation
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we decompose the net factor income channel into factor income inflows and factor
income outflows in order to examine the sole effect of revenues from foreign asset holdings on
income smoothing. We find that net factor income channel in the OECD countries during 1999-
2007 period is mainly driven by net financial asset income, while the other two sub-components
(net compensation of employees, net taxes on imports) turn out to be ineffective. Once factor
income inflows are distinguished from outflows, empirical evidence suggests a non-significant
effect of inflows in terms of income smoothing as opposed to a positive and significant role of
factor income outflows (18 percent for the EMU and 16 percent for the EU). We document that
both (i) the tendency of European investors to allocate a sizeable portion of their assets within
the Euro zone, and (ii) the increasing business cycle synchronization among EU economies have
lead to pro-cyclical movements between the foreign asset revenues and domestic output shocks,
thereby undermining the risk sharing mechanism. When shocks to income are decomposed into
positive and negative realizations, results reveal that factor income outflows are statistically
significant only to smooth the positive shocks to GDP, while neither inflows or outflows channels
are significant enough in attenuating negative output shocks. Furthermore, the factor income
outflow channel appears robust to longer lasting shocks than factor income inflows, while the
latter play an important role for consumption smoothing in recent years. We go on to explore
the determinants of income smoothing and document that an increase in foreign equity and
debt liabilities positively affects the extent of smoothing via factor income outflows. Whereas,
contrary to the current literature, an increase in foreign assets holding does not have a positive
impact on smoothing via factor income inflows. We also notice that the diversification of foreign
equity and bond holdings across various markets leads to an improvement in risk sharing through
factor income inflows.
with that of the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007): 0.73 for the entire sample, and 0.82 for the EU sample. Not
surprisingly, empirical results presented in Tables 9 and 10 are not significantly affected when using the Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) measure. These unreported results are available on request.
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A Data appendix
Bilateral foreign equity and debt asset data are taken from IMF’s coordinated portfolio in-
vestment surveys (CPIS), 2001-2007. GDP, GNI, factor income inflows, factor income out-
flows, population and consumer price indices are obtained from OECD’s National Accounts
database (volume I), 1970-2007. We compute purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted GDP,
GNI, GDPIN, and GDPOUT by deflating all series with the implicit private consumption de-
flator. We do not use quantity indices for real GDP because we want to measure how the
purchasing value of GDP is insured internationally. Growth rates of GDP, GNI, GDPIN, and
GDPOUT are the growth rates of per capita PPP-adjusted variables. The PPP-adjusted series
are aggregated to the EMU-wide, EU-wide, and non-EU OECD wide series. The disaggregation
of net factor income variable, i.e., net compensation of employees, net financial asset incomes,
and net tax on imports are obtained from OECD’s National Accounts Detailed Tables (volume
II), 1999-2007.
Stock market capitalization for a country is measured as the value of publicly traded equity
listed on the stock market exchange(s). This data is published by Standard and Poor’s. We
define world market capitalization as the sum of the stock market capitalizations of the 30
developed and 81 emerging stock markets listed according to Standard and Poor’s. We obtain
data for the market capitalization of bond markets from the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) Quarterly Review. We measure the size of a country’s total bond market capitalization as
outstanding domestic debt securities minus outstanding short term (less than one year remaining
maturity) domestic securities plus outstanding international bonds and notes. Again we create
the bond world market capitalization as the sum of the stock market capitalizations of the 30
developed and 81 emerging stock markets listed according to Standard and Poor’s.
B Derivation of equation (1)
The derivation of equation (1) follows directly the cross-section decomposition in output pro-
posed by Asdrubali et al. (1996). Interested readers are referred to the original paper for full
details. Consider the following identity:
GDP
i =
GDPi
GNIi
GNI
i, (B.1)
where all magnitudes are in real per capita terms and i denotes an index of country. To stress
the cross-sectional nature of the derivation, time index is omitted. Taking logs and differences
on both sides of the above equation, multiply both sides by ∆ logGDPi (minus its mean) and
taking the cross-sectional average, we obtain the following variance decomposition:
var{∆ logGDPi} = cov{∆ logGDPi −∆ logGNIi,∆ logGDPi}
In this equation, “varX” and “covX,Y” denote the statistics 1N
∑N
i=1(X
i−X¯)2 and 1N
∑N
i=1(X
i−
X¯)(Yi − Y¯), respectively, where N is the number of countries in the sample. Now, dividing by
var{∆ logGDPi}, we get 1 = βf + βu, where,
βf =
cov{∆ logGDPi −∆ logGNIi,∆ logGDPi}
var{∆ logGDPi} , (B.2)
is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression of ∆ logGDPi−
∆ logGNIi on ∆ logGDPi; and,
βu =
cov{∆ log(Ci + Gi),∆ logGDPi}
var{∆ logGDPi} , (B.3)
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which is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression
∆ log(Ci + Gi) on ∆ logGDPi. We do not impose any restriction on βf , which could take a
value of 100%, which implies that real GNI growth rate is perfectly uncorrelated with real GDP
growth rate. Likewise, when βf takes a value of 0%, indicates that real GNI growth rate is
perfectly correlated with real GDP growth rate. Moreover, since βf is not restricted to be a
positive number, when per capita consumption growth is highly sensitive to per capita GDP
growth (i.e., βu > 1), βf might be negative, indicating consumption dis-smoothing.
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Figure 1: Foreign asset receipts to GDP and foreign liability payments to GDP ratios in OECD
countries, 1970-2007
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Source: U.N. Detailed National Accounts Database, and authors' own calculations. Both foreign asset 
receipts to GDP and foreign liability payments to GDP ratios are averaged over the 1970-2007 period. 
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Figure 2: Income smoothing via net factor income, factor income inflows, and factor income
outflows channels in EMU and non-EU OECD economies, 1972-2007
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Table 1: Equity home bias in selected markets (percent)
Country 1997 2001 2004 2007
Denmark 79.7 56.1 51.4 48.5
Finland 94.1 74.4 51.3 48.8
France 83.5 69.4 59.5 62.7
Germany NA 49.9 43.3 42.3
Netherlands 70.2 35.4 20.1 12.2
Norway 84.6 50.4 46.1 46.8
Sweden 79.2 51.1 50.8 49.7
Switzerland NA 57.3 52.6 51.1
United Kingdom 75.9 64.0 56.1 52.2
USA 79.0 69.6 59.1 52.3
Japan 92.1 86.1 84.7 83.7
Source: Kang and Melas (2010). Home bias is de-
fined as 1 – (actual international equity allocation
/ market-cap based international equity allocation).
NA: not applicable.
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Table 2: Decomposition of international income smoothing via components of net factor income
channel (percent)
1999–2007 1999–2007 1999–2007
NET COMP. OF EMPLOYEE NET TAX ON IMPORT NET FIN. ASSET INCOME
(1− βcp) (1− βtp) (1− βfa)
EMU -1 1 13
(1) (1) (3)
OBS 88 88 88
EU -1 (1) 12
(0) (1) (4)
OBS 112 112 112
OECD 1 (0) 7
(0) (1) (4)
OBS 176 176 176
EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK, and the US.Percentages describe the shocks absorbed at each level of
smoothing.
Income smoothing percentage from net compensation of channel is (1 − βcp), where βcp is
the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ log ˜(GDP + NET COMP. OF EMPLOYEE)it
on ∆ log G˜DPit. The income smoothing percentage from the net tax on imports chan-
nel is (1 − βtp), where βtp is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of
∆ log ˜(GDP + NET TAX ON IMPORT)it on ∆ log G˜DPit. The income smoothing percentage from
net revenue from financial assets is (1− βfa), where βfa is the GLS estimate of the slope in
the regression of ∆ log G˜DPit −∆ log ˜(GDP + NET FIN. ASSET INCOME)it on ∆ log G˜DPit.
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Table 3: International income smoothing via net factor income and its subcomponents (percent)
Panel A: EMU
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007
(1− βf ) 0 0 4 8
(1) (3) (3) (2)
(1− β+f ) 4 1 –10 –9
(2) (3) (3) (6)
(1− β−f ) –3 –2 14 18
(1) (1) (7) (8)
OBS 110 110 110 77
Panel B: EU
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007
(1− βf ) 0 –2 0 7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1− β+f ) 3 4 –12 –6
(1) (2) (3) (7)
(1− β−f ) –3 –7 14 16
(1) (3) (6) (10)
OBS 140 140 140 98
Panel C: Non-EU OECD
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007
(1− βf ) –1 –3 0 5
(1) (1) (3) (3)
(1− β+f ) –1 1 –2 4
(1) (4) (7) (3)
(1− β−f ) 0 –4 2 3
(1) (3) (2) (1)
OBS 80 80 80 56
EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
Non-EU OECD: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and the US.
We exclude Luxembourg, since it is an outlier with its position. Per-
centages describe the shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing.
Standard errors are shown in brackets. (1− βf ) is the amount of in-
come smoothing via the net factor income flow channel and the coeffi-
cient βf is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ log G˜NIit
on ∆ log G˜DPit. (1−β+f ) is the amount of income smoothing via factor
income inflow channel where β+f , the GLS estimate of the slope in the
regression of ∆ log ˜(GDP + FACTOR INCOME INFLOW)it on ∆ log G˜DPit.
(1 − β−f ) is the amount of income smoothing via the net factor in-
come flow channel, and the coefficient β−f is the GLS estimate of the
slope in the regression of ∆ log ˜(GDP− FACTOR INCOME OUTFLOW)it
on ∆ log G˜DPit.
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Table 5: International income smoothing via net factor income and its subcomponents with
three-year frequency of the data (percent)
Panel A: EMU
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007
(1− βf ) −3 −9 8 14
(2) (5) (3) (4)
(1− β+f ) −3 −1 –16 –7
(3) (2) (3) (4)
(1− β−f ) 2 –9 25 21
(1) (4) (9) (8)
OBS 110 110 110 77
Panel B: EU
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007
(1− βf ) −2 –6 4 13
(2) (3) (3) (4)
(1− β+f ) 0 4 –12 –1
(2) (2) (3) (5)
(1− β−f ) –1 –11 17 14
(3) (4) (4) (6)
OBS 140 140 140 98
Panel C: Non-EU OECD
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007
(1− βf ) 5 1 1 –2
(2) (3) (2) (3)
(1− β+f ) 1 –6 –4 –12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1− β−f ) 3 8 7 11
(2) (3) (3) (4)
OBS 80 80 80 56
EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
Non-EU OECD: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and the US.
We exclude Luxembourg, since it is an outlier with its position. Per-
centages describe the shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing.
Standard errors are shown in brackets. (1− βf ) is the amount of in-
come smoothing via the net factor income flow channel and the coeffi-
cient βf is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ log G˜NIit
on ∆ log G˜DPit. (1−β+f ) is the amount of income smoothing via factor
income inflow channel where β+f , the GLS estimate of the slope in the
regression of ∆ log ˜(GDP + FACTOR INCOME INFLOW)it on ∆ log G˜DPit.
(1 − β−f ) is the amount of income smoothing via the net factor in-
come flow channel, and the coefficient β−f is the GLS estimate of the
slope in the regression of ∆ log ˜(GDP− FACTOR INCOME OUTFLOW)it
on ∆ log G˜DPit.
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Table 6: Consumption smoothing via net factor income and its subcomponents (percent)
Panel A: EMU
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007
(1− βc) 61 39 55 62
(8) (8) (7) (9)
(1− β+c ) 47 28 76 68
(6) (9) (9) (8)
(1− β−c ) 50 35 48 68
(7) (7) (6) (14)
OBS 110 110 110 77
Panel B: EU
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007
(1− βc) 50 38 54 58
(7) (6) (6) (7)
(1− β+c ) 43 32 74 65
(5) (8) (8) (13)
(1− β−c ) 48 37 52 58
(5) (7) (6) (12)
OBS 140 140 140 98
Panel C: Non-EU OECD
1971–1980 1981–1990 1991–2000 2001–2007
(1− βc) 56 51 54 59
(7) (4) (10) (6)
(1− β+c ) 49 50 68 61
(5) (5) (5) (14)
(1− β−c ) 44 44 47 57
(5) (11) (5) (9)
OBS 80 80 80 56
EMU: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
Non-EU OECD: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and the US.
We exclude Luxembourg, since it is an outlier with its position.
Percentages describe the shocks absorbed at each level of smooth-
ing. Standard errors are shown in brackets. (1 − βc) is the
amount of consumption smoothing. βc is the GLS estimate of the
slope in the regression of ∆ log C˜it on ∆ log G˜DP
i
t. (1 − β+c ) is the
amount of consumption smoothing via factor income inflow chan-
nel where β+c , the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of
∆ log ˜(C− FACTOR INCOME INFLOW)it on ∆ log G˜DPit. (1 − β−c ) is the
amount of income smoothing via the net factor income flow chan-
nel, and the coefficient β−c is the GLS estimate of the slope in the
regression of ∆ log ˜(C + FACTOR INCOME OUTFLOW)it on ∆ log G˜DPit.
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Table 7: Determinants of income smoothing via net factor income inflows: Stock of foreign
assets (percent), 2001–2007.
Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU
EU EU EU OECD OECD OECD
γ+0 11 19 9 13 19 9
(15) (17) (16) (11) (11) (16)
TREND −5 −6 −3 −5 −6 −3
(5) (1) (4) (5) (3) (4)
EQUITY ASSETS –7 −5
(3) (1)
DEBT ASSETS 11 −1
(11) (2)
FDI ASSETS −7 −2
(11) (2)
OBS 98 98 98 56 56 56
EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
Non-EU OECD: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland, and the US.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in parenthesis. The
amount of income smoothing via factor income flow is: 100∗(1−γ+0 )−γ+1 −
γ+2 . The parameters, γ
+
0 , γ
+
1 , and γ
+
2 are estimated from the following re-
gression model: ∆ log ˜(GDP + FACTOR INCOME INFLOW)
i
t=γ
+∆ log G˜DP
i
t+
i
t.
where γ+ = γ+0 + γ
+
1 (TREND − TRENDt) + γ+2 (Xit − Xt). γ0 is the av-
erage amount of income smoothing via factor income inflows. TREND is
the time trend variable. Xit contains EQUITY ASSETS
i
t, DEBT ASSETS
i
t, and
FDI ASSETS
i
t. Xt is the (un-weighted) average across countries of variable
Xit . EQUITY ASSETS
i
t is the stock of foreign equity assets (in logarithms)
that country i has at time t. DEBT ASSETSit is the total stock of foreign debt
assets (in logarithms) that country i has at time t. FDI ASSETSit is the total
stock of foreign direct investments that country i has at time t.
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Table 8: Determinants of income smoothing via net factor income outflows: Stock of foreign
liabilities (percent), 2001–2007.
Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU
EU EU EU OECD OECD OECD
γ−0 24 20 11 13 19 9
(27) (22) (18) (11) (11) (16)
TREND 1 −5 −4 −5 −6 −3
(7) (5) (4) (5) (3) (4)
EQUITY LIABILITIES 29 −5
(13) (1)
DEBT LIABILITIES 70 −1
(44) (2)
FDI LIABILITIES 12 −2
(24) (2)
OBS 98 98 98 56 56 56
EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
Non-EU OECD: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Switzerland, and the US.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in parenthesis. The
amount of income smoothing via factor income flow is: 100 ∗ (1− γ−0 )− γ−1 − γ−2 .
The parameters, γ−0 , γ
−
1 , and γ
−
2 are estimated from the following regres-
sion model: ∆ log ˜(GDP− FACTOR INCOME OUTFLOW)
i
t=γ
−∆ log G˜DPit+
i
t, where
γ− = γ−0 + γ
−
1 (TREND − TRENDt) + γ−2 (Xit − Xt). γ0 is the average amount of
income smoothing via factor income inflows. TREND is the time trend variable.
Xit contains EQUITY LIABILITIES
i
t, DEBT LIABILITIES
i
t, and FDI LIABILITIES
i
t. Xt is
the (un-weighted) average across countries of variable Xit . EQUITY LIABILITIES
i
t
is the stock of foreign equity liabilities (in logarithms) that country i has at time
t. DEBT LIABILITIESit is the total stock of foreign debt liabilities (in logarithms)
that country i has at time t. FDI LIABILITIESit is the total stock of foreign direct
investments (in logarithms) inflows that country i has at time t.
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Table 9: Determinants of income smoothing via net factor income inflows: Diversification index
and Euro portfolio shares (EU countries, percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γ+0 23 18 26 24
(27) (8) (18) (11)
TREND −10 −12 −12 –11
(7) (6) (5) (5)
EURO SHARE DEBT ASSETS −24
(7)
EURO SHARE EQUITY ASSETS 8
(8)
DIVERSIFICATION OF DEBT PORTFOLIO 31
(14)
DIVERSIFICATION OF EQUITY PORTFOLIO 29
(8)
OBS 98 98 98 98
EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, Sweden, and the UK.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in paren-
thesis. The amount of income smoothing via factor income
flows is: 100 ∗ (1 − γ+0 ) − γ+1 − γ+2 . The parameters, γ+0 ,
γ+1 , and γ
+
2 are estimated from the following regression model:
∆ log ˜(GDP + FACTOR INCOME INFLOW)
i
t=γ
+∆ log G˜DP
i
t+
i
t, where
γ+ = γ+0 + γ
+
1 (TREND − TRENDt) + γ+2 (Xit − Xt). γ0 is the aver-
age amount of income smoothing via factor income inflows. TREND
is the time trend variable. Xit contains EURO SHARE DEBT ASSETS
i
t,
EURO SHARE EQUITY ASSETS
i
t, DIVERSIFICATION OF DEBT PORTFOLIO
i
t,
DIVERSIFICATION OF EQUITY PORTFOLIO
i
t. Xt is the (un-weighted) average
across countries of variable Xit . EURO SHARE DEBT ASSETS
i
t is the share
of Euro countries in the foreign debt assets of country i at time t.
EURO SHARE EQUITY ASSETS
i
t is the share of Euro countries in the foreign
equity assets of country i at time t. DIVERSIFICATION OF DEBT PORTFOLIO
is a diversification index created to measure the extent of the di-
versification of the foreign debt assets country i has at time t.
DIVERSIFICATION OF EQUITY PORTFOLIO is a diversification index cre-
ated to measure the extent of the diversification of the foreign equity assets
country i has at time t.
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Table 10: Determinants of income smoothing via net factor income inflows: Diversification
index and Euro portfolio shares (Non-EU OECD countries, percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γ+0 −29 −31 25 17
(12) (12) (17) (11)
TREND 8 6 11 –6
(3) (3) (7) (6)
EURO SHARE DEBT ASSETS −36
(18)
EURO SHARE EQUITY ASSETS −23
(15)
DIVERSIFICATION OF DEBT PORTFOLIO 25
(13)
DIVERSIFICATION OF EQUITY PORTFOLIO 69
(26)
OBS 56 56 56 56
Non-EU OECD: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea Republic, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and the US.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are given in paren-
thesis. The amount of income smoothing via factor income
flows is: 100 ∗ (1 − γ+0 ) − γ+1 − γ+2 . The parameters, γ+0 ,
γ+1 , and γ
+
2 are estimated from the following regression model:
∆ log ˜(GDP + FACTOR INCOME INFLOW)
i
t=γ
+∆ log G˜DP
i
t+
i
t, where
γ+ = γ+0 + γ
+
1 (TREND − TRENDt) + γ+2 (Xit − Xt). γ0 is the aver-
age amount of income smoothing via factor income inflows. TREND
is the time trend variable. Xit contains EURO SHARE DEBT ASSETS
i
t,
EURO SHARE EQUITY ASSETS
i
t, DIVERSIFICATION OF DEBT PORTFOLIO
i
t,
DIVERSIFICATION OF EQUITY PORTFOLIO
i
t. Xt is the (un-weighted) average
across countries of variable Xit . EURO SHARE DEBT ASSETS
i
t is the share
of Euro countries in the foreign debt assets of country i at time t.
EURO SHARE EQUITY ASSETS
i
t is the share of Euro countries in the foreign
equity assets of country i at time t. DIVERSIFICATION OF DEBT PORTFOLIO
is a diversification index created to measure the extent of the di-
versification of the foreign debt assets country i has at time t.
DIVERSIFICATION OF EQUITY PORTFOLIO is a diversification index cre-
ated to measure the extent of the diversification of the foreign equity assets
country i has at time t.
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